Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,'
the Supreme Court for the first time directly addressed the preemption removal problem. 7 It indicated that removal is proper if "a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of action [because] any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law."" Although Franchise Tax Board recognized that preemption removal is proper in some instances, the Court failed to explain how preemption removal fits into the overall framework of original federal jurisdiction and the well-pleaded complaint rule. Since the relationship between federal preemption and a plaintiff's cause of action is frequently quite complex, the ambiguities of Franchise Tax Board may render its application to future cases difficult. In addition, the Court failed to discuss approaches to the preemption removal problem that had previously been taken by lower courts. As a result, the continuing validity of the "artful pleading doctrine," which permits removal where the plaintiff has manipulated his complaint to avoid presenting a federal question, is left unclear. Nor does Franchise Tax Board resolve whether preemption removal is ever proper when the preempting federal law does not create a superseding cause of action.
This comment seeks to answer these questions by exploring the implications of Franchise Tax Board for the interpretation of the well-pleaded complaint rule. Part I considers the well-pleaded complaint rule's history and purposes, and reveals a recurrent ambiguity in the Court's pronouncements as to whether the rule requires that a federal question be presented by the language of the complaint or whether a court can look beyond the face of the complaint to ascertain the underlying nature of the plaintiff's cause of action. Part II presents the approaches to preemption removal taken prior to Franchise Tax Board, and concludes that the lower courts' difficulties with the preemption removal problem reflect the tension created by the ambiguity in the well-pleaded complaint rule. Finally, Part III examines Franchise Tax Board's resolution of this tension. It suggests that the decision is consistent with an interpretation of the rule that focuses on the plaintiff's underlying 6 103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983). constitutional counterpart by the application to it of the wellpleaded complaint rule. 14 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, jurisdiction may not be based on a plaintiff's anticipation in his complaint of a federal defense or a federal response to a possible defense. 15 The rule is carried over to the removal context by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which limits removal to cases over which federal district courts would have had original jurisdiction. 6 14 For a long time, there was considerable doubt whether the well-pleaded complaint rule was a constitutional as well as a statutory limitation on federal question jurisdiction. There is language in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.), the preeminent early case construing the scope of constitutional federal question jurisdiction, that might be read to imply a constitutional well-pleaded complaint rule: " [W] hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is within the power of Congress to give . . . jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or law may be involved in it." Id. at 823 (emphasis added). Judge Friendly apparently reads Osborn this way. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964 ) (Osborn extends the constitutional limits of original federal question jurisdiction "to every case in which federal law furnished a necessary ingredient of the claim." (emphasis added)). Other language in Osborn, however, would tend to suggest that this reference to the original cause is not intended to limit the constitutional reach of original jurisdiction. For example, Chief Justice Marshall also stated that original federal question jurisdiction could be conferred over any case to which appellate jurisdiction extends, see Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 820-21, which, given the constitutionality of appellate federal question jurisdiction over federal defenses, see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 824 ("The questions which the case involves, then, must determine its character, whether those questions be made in the cause or not."), implies that original jurisdiction could be conferred over cases involving federal defenses.
Osborn has not, in fact, generally been read to impose the well-pleaded complaint rule as a constitutional requirement. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("traditional interpretation" of Osborn and other cases is that jurisdiction may be extended to any case involving "potential federal questions"); Hornstein, supra note 10, at 576. Recently, the Supreme Court settled the dispute, locating the source of the well-pleaded complaint rule in the statutory grant of jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), and not in the Constitution. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank, 103 S. Ct. 1962 Ct. , 1972 Ct. (1983 (upholding 28 U.S.C. § 1330, which provides for original jurisdiction in federal court over cases involving foreign sovereigns or their representatives, despite the fact the plaintiff's claim for relief did not depend on any issue of federal law). For further discussion of Verlinden and the constitutional implications of the well-pleaded complaint rule, see infra notes 22, 25 and accompanying text. 
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The case most frequently cited in support of the well-pleaded complaint rule is Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley. 17 Mottley, the plaintiff, alleged in her complaint that a federal statute on which the railroad was expected to rely in defense was unconstitutional, and sought to use this allegation as the basis for federal question jurisdiction. Although the validity of the railroad's defense had been litigated below, the Court raised the jurisdictional defect sua sponte, holding that "a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution." 18 Consequently, the Court concluded, " 'a suggestion of one party, that the other will or may set up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not make the suit one arising under that Constitution or those laws' ,,;19 the Court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. The Court did not explain or justify its holding, but simply declared it to be a "settled interpretation," citing a number of cases in support of the rule. 2 "
Although it has been the target of substantial criticism, particularly as applied in the removal context, 21 and despite its long history, the rationale of the well-pleaded complaint rule has seldom been thoroughly analyzed. It is clear, however, that the wellpleaded complaint rule serves an important purpose in the scheme of federal jurisdiction by limiting the reach of original federal basis for removal. 152 U.S. at 461-62. Although the statutory language relied on by the Court appears to compel application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to removal, an alternative interpretation has been offered suggesting that the language merely refers to and incorporates the requirement of a minimum amount in controversy for original jurisdiction. See Hornstein, supra note 10, at 606 n.234. This alternative interpretation could not apply to the current removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982), because there is no longer a requirement of an amount in controversy for original federal question jurisdiction. 233-34 (1948) . But see H. FRIENDLY, supra note 10, at 124 (arguing that federal defense removal would overburden federal courts). A thorough discussion of the desirability of federal defense removal is beyond the scope of this comment.
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Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule question jurisdiction. In contrast to appellate jurisdiction, where the questions before the court are fixed by the decision below and by the questions presented on appeal, it is unclear at the time a court exercises original jurisdiction precisely which issues will arise during the course of the litigation. 2 A federal question might be raised during the course of virtually any litigation. 3 Thus, to base original federal question jurisdiction on the existence of merely potential federal questions in a case would render illusory the limitation of federal jurisdiction in article III to specifically enumerated classes of cases. The well-pleaded complaint rule avoids this consequence.
To say that the well-pleaded complaint rule is designed to limit original federal question jurisdiction, however, does not, without more, justify it. The well-pleaded complaint rule withdraws from original federal jurisdiction a large number of cases that eventually do turn on the validity of a federal defense, and such cases are within the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. 2 4 One is therefore required to articulate a rationale for the particular limit placed on federal jurisdiction by the well-pleaded complaint rule.
The well-pleaded complaint rule does solve one obvious problem with predicating original jurisdiction on a federal defense: that the defense may never be raised. The proposition that a case arises under a law that is never raised during the entire course of an action seems untenable. 
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The University of Chicago Law Review federal defense may in fact have been raised by the defendant at the time he seeks removal, the application of the rule to bar removal based on a federal defense suggests that this concern is not the only one addressed by the rule.
Unlike the concern with avoiding federal jurisdiction over cases in which issues of federal law are never actually raised, a second reason for limiting original jurisdiction to cases in which the plaintiff relies on federal law does apply to the removal context. This reason, that federal jurisdiction is more appropriate where issues of federal law are likely to dominate, supports the wellpleaded complaint rule provided one accepts the intuitively appealing presumption that if the plaintiff relies on federal law in stating his claim, federal issues are more likely to dominate the action, while if federal law appears only as a defense (or a reply to a defense) to a state-law cause of action, it is likely that many of the dominant issues to be decided will be questions of state law. 26
Thus, the Court did not apply the rule in Verlinden to invalidate the lower court's assertion of jurisdiction under § 1330. 103 S. Ct. at 1972-73. That Verlinden rejected a constitutional basis for the well-pleaded complaint rule is not as certain as it might seem at first glance. The Court did not reach the issue whether jurisdiction could constitutionally be based on a purely speculative potential federal question, because "a suit against a foreign state under this Act necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law at the very outset . . . ." Id. at 1971. The Court reasoned that a federal question was necessarily presented in every case under the Act because the Act requires the plaintiff to establish the existence of one of the statutorily specified exceptions to the defense of sovereign immunity in order to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1971 & n.20 . Under this reasoning, the federal question is in fact raised by the plaintiff's complaint, and the statute in question is perfectly consistent with a constitutional well-pleaded complaint rule. Thus, Verlinden can be read as stopping short of approving original jurisdiction based on a federal question that has not been raised at the time jurisdiction attaches.
Even if Verlinden does provide authority for the proposition that the well-pleaded complaint rule is not constitutionally mandated, it is clear that if the notion of limited jurisdiction is to have any meaning at all, there must be a line drawn beyond which the mere possibility of a federal question arising is too remote to countenance an assertion of federal jurisdiction. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Where there has been a narrow grant of jurisdiction over a specific class of cases, such as the jurisdictional grant at issue in Verlinden, it is relatively certain that a federal question will be presented, even where it has not been raised in the complaint. Where the jurisdictional grant is general, such as that in § 1331, however, an interpretation of article IH which would allow original federal jurisdiction over any case that contained even the mere possibility of a federal question, would allow unlimited federal jurisdiction since every case contains at least such a possibility, see supra note 23 and accompanying text. There, a constitutional rule delineating those instances in which the potential federal question is too speculative is necessary to preserve any scope for state jurisdiction in the face of a general grant of federal question jurisdiction.
2' That selecting those cases in which federal issues are more likely to dominate is in fact the more likely purpose of the rule is supported not only by cases that rely on such an analysis to decide whether the rule applies, see Franchise Tax Board, 103 S. Ct. 2841; Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 339 U.S. 667 (1950), but by operation of the rule itself.
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Thus, the well-pleaded complaint rule may be regarded as limiting federal jurisdiction to cases in which federal issues are likely to predominate. Though this rationale serves to justify the rule, it complicates its application. The Mottley Court's formulation of the rule, which requires that the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action must raise the federal question, 7 is too crude a tool for application to the many complexities of federal jurisdiction. The Court in Mottley itself found that plaintiff's statement improperly raised a federal question because it did so in anticipation of a defense. Thus, the Court ignored the plaintiff's statement and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The root of the difficulty in applying the Mottley formulation of the rule is the difficulty in determining what the plaintiff's cause of action is in a given case. Mottley is unclear about the extent to which the court should rely on "the plaintiff's statement" or look beyond the face of the complaint to determine if his cause of action really does involve federal issues. As a consequence, the Court was required in subsequent cases to refine the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Early cases emphasized those aspects of the Mottley formulation of the well-pleaded complaint rule that focused on "the plaintiff's statement." While recognizing that a plaintiff could not obtain a federal forum by anticipating a defense (the Mottley case itself), these cases generally considered the language of the complaint dispositive. The leading authority for this approach is Gully v. First National Bank, 2 8 in which the Court held that removal of an action to collect a state tax by levying on assets of a taxpayer held by a national bank could not properly be based on a federal statute permitting states to tax national banks. Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, traced the confused course of opinions that attempted to ascertain whether a suit arises under federal law, 2 and concluded that the federal question "must be an element, and Removal is not permitted when the defendant raises a federal defense, and thus presumably has an interest in having it adjudicated in a federal forum. Nor does a given plaintiff have access to federal courts when, as the issues have developed, he relies, by way of replication, on assertion of a federal right. The logical inference from these observations is that it is concern for the issues alone, and not for the parties, which is at work, and, in fact, the federal courts will not take jurisdiction under § 1331 unless it is more than likely that federal issues will predominate, even where the complaint raises a federal question on its face. 
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The University of Chicago Law Review 31 Gully placed particular emphasis on a strict limitation to the language of the plaintiff's complaint. Gully incorporates into the well-pleaded complaint rule the doctrine that the plaintiff is master of his own complaint, 32 since, under Gully, the complaint is considered to be absolutely dispositive of the cause of action. This focus on the language of the plaintiff's complaint seems intended to simplify the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule. The limitation to the language of the complaint itself, according to Justice Cardozo, is the product of considerable experience with the difficulties of applying the rule and a resulting desire to find a formulation that is simple to apply." The advantages of such a formulation in terms of administrability are obvious. Gully's focus on the language of the complaint saves considerable time and expense, and enhances the predictability, reliability, uniformity, and reviewability of results. 4 33 Justice Cardozo specifically rejected as "hazard[ous]" the argument that the Court should look beyond the face of the complaint in order to determine the true character of the plaintiff's "'cause of action.'" 299 U.S. at 117. He argued that " [w] hat is needed is something of that common-sense accomodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of causation," id., and contended that the wellpleaded complaint rule, with the limitation to the face of the complaint, was the product of "a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside," id. at 118. The rule formulated as a result of this experience, he concluded, must be adhered to: "We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by." Id. 34 One might also justify the Gully formulation of the rule by arguing that the Court should restrict its analysis to the complaint out of deference to a plaintiff's right to waive any federal rights he may have and plead only his state law claims. This rationale is inadequate for several reasons. First, nowhere in Gully is it mentioned as a consideration for the rule, while simplicity of application figures prominently in Justice Cardozo's opinion. See supra note 33. Second, a plaintiff's right to waive any federal claims he has is not denied by looking beyond his complaint. The question is, rather, how deeply the court may examine the case in order to determine whether a plaintiff is asserting such claims. The difficulty arises from the close relation the right to waive federal claims bears to the plaintiff's right to choose a forum. For a demonstration that the plaintiff's right to choose a forum cannot justify the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule in the removal context, see infra the Gully language-of-the-complaint requirement would make the jurisdictional inquiry a very simple one, since the court need consider only a single document.
Other facets of the well-pleaded complaint rule, however, suggest that administrative convenience and the plaintiff's mastery of his own complaint are of secondary importance in applying the rule. For example, Mottley requires courts to disregard those of plaintiff's allegations that anticipate a defense,3 5 thereby limiting the plaintiff's mastery of his own complaint and evincing the court's willingness to hazard the administratively more difficult inquiry into which allegations in a complaint are essential. Furthermore, the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to removal does not appear to be motivated by concern for the plaintiff's mastery of his complaint.
3 7 Finally, the refusal to consider the language of the removal petition or answer cannot be said to enhance significantly the administrability of the rule 3 8 par- Of course, there is a difference between determining that a plaintiff has pleaded too much and looking beyond the complaint to see whether the plaintiff has pleaded enough. With the former inquiry, the court may stop at the complaint and apply established rules of law to the stated cause of action in order to decide which elements are part of the prima facie case and which anticipate affirmative defenses. Nonetheless, even this inquiry will often be extremely difficult, especially in light of modern notice pleading rules. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
"' Removal does not affect the plaintiff's cause of action; it does, however, limit his traditionally unfettered choice of a forum, often considered a corollary to the plaintiff's mastery of his complaint. The application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to deny federal defense removal cannot be based on an overriding desire to preserve the plaintiff's choice of forum. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. It would be wholly anomalous to allow a defendant to defeat the plaintiff's actual choice of forum, state court, in order to have the plaintiff's rights vindicated in a federal forum, while holding the plaintiff's choice of a nonfederal forum to be dispositive when the defendant asserts a federal right. This anomaly will, of course, be present to some degree as long as § 1441 predicates removal on the availability of federal jurisdiction as an original matter. See Wechsler, supra note 21, at 233-34. 38 To the extent that the well-pleaded complaint rule is intended to insure that federal law has in fact been raised by the party relying on it, the court need only read the answer or removal petition to see whether there is any reliance on federal law. Insofar as the number of pleadings to be considered remains limited, there would be little or no loss in any of the factors served by administratively simple rules: cost and time savings, predictability, reliability, uniformity, and reviewability.
ticularly with the advent of lenient notice pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. e An alternative reading of the Mottley decision emphasizes the phrase "cause of action." Under this approach to the well-pleaded complaint rule, the court may look beyond the plaintiff's complaint in order to establish the true nature of the underlying dispute as either state or federal. A striking example of this reading, surprisingly enough, 40 is found in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 41 where the Court held that original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions must be tested by reference to an underlying action for damages or injunction rather than the complaint for declaratory relief. 42 Thus, although the complaint for declaratory relief in Skelly Oil properly alleged a federal right relied upon by the declaratory judgment plaintiff, the Court held that the federal right was "injected into the case only in anticipation of a defense" because the underlying contract claim arose under state law.' 3 Skelly Oil presents a very different view of the well-pleaded complaint rule from that expressed in Gully. Under Skelly Oil, it is incumbent upon a court to look beyond a declaratory judgment complaint's proper reliance on federal law in order to recharacterize the cause of action in terms of the underlying dispute. The Court must construct a hypothetical law suit and examine that suit 40 It is surprising because Justice Frankfurter, no friend of expansive federal jurisdiction, rejected the Gully language-of-the-complaint standard and looked through the plaintiff's complaint to the underlying cause of action in order to avoid an expansion of federal jurisdiction arising from the Declaratory Judgment Act, Pub. L. No. 343, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982)). See Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671-72. Part II of this comment demonstrates that the lower courts adopted a similar integration of the wellpleaded complaint rule in order to expand federal jurisdiction in preemption removal cases. It is this theory of the well-pleaded complaint rule that Franchise Tax Board adopts. See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text. Thus, the approach has come full circle: used by the Supreme Court to limit federal jurisdiction in Skelly Oil, it is picked up by the lower courts as a means of expanding federal jurisdiction in preemption removal cases and is finally reembraced by the Supreme Court in that guise in Franchise Tax Board.
41 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
42 Id. at 671-74. 4 Id. at 672.
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule to determine whether or not the genuine dispute is based on state or federal law."' To the extent that Skelly Oil requires the courts, in applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, to unravel declaratory judgment actions in order to identify the underlying cause of action, a certain consistency is imposed on the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule. Whether the action is one originally filed in federal court, an action removed to federal court by the defendant, or a declaratory judgment action, jurisdiction is tested on the basis of the cause of action of the party who actually or hypothetically seeks affirmative relief. This consistency is achieved, however, at the price of administrative convenience.
It is still necessary to ask how the purposes of the wellpleaded complaint rule are served by requiring the court to identify the underlying cause of action in declaratory judgment actions. The complaint for declaratory relief properly relies on federal law, so that federal law has been raised at the time jurisdiction attaches. The essential purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule, however, is to screen out cases that are primarily state-law mat- 44 Although the Court rested its holding in Skelly Oil in part on its interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act, Pub. L. No. 343, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982)), the Court also discussed the importance of preserving general limits on original federal jurisdiction: " [It] would turn into the federal courts a vast current of litigation indubitably arising under State law, in the sense that the right to be vindicated was State-created, if a suit for a declaration of rights could be brought into the federal courts merely because an anticipated defense derived from federal law." 339 U.S. at 673.
This language suggests that the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to the declaratory judgment claims is not merely an interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act, but rather also furthers the purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule itself. This conclusion is supported by the extension, in Franchise Tax Board, of the Skelly Oil principle to declaratory judgment proceedings brought pursuant to state statutes. Franchise Tax Board, 103 S. Ct. at 2851. The Franchise Tax Board Court based its extension of Skelly Oil to state declaratory judgment statutes at least in part upon an effort to preserve the intended limits of the federal declaratory judgment statute, id. at 2851, and one might argue that this extension is thus merely a preemptive application of the federal statute. However, this argument attributes a great deal of force to a legislative intent that was only inferred in Skelly Oil itself. See Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671, where the Court relied on a statement in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) , that the Declaratory Judgment Act was "procedural only." The Aetna Court, however, was concerned with the question whether the Declaratory Judgment Act had impermissibly given federal courts jurisdiction over matters not cases or controversies within the limitation of article I, and did not purport to address the Act's effect on federal question jurisdiction. See Aetna, 300 U.S. at 239-40. The Skelly Oil Court simply applied the language quoted from Aetna to the problem of assessing the existence of federal question jurisdiction over actions brought pursuant to the Act without explanation or qualification. A more plausible explanation for the Court's decision in Franchise Tax Board is that the Skelly Oil principle inheres in the nature of the jurisdictional inquiry as applied to declaratory judgment actions. See Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 673.
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[51:634 ters, even though a federal issue lurks in the background. 4 5 The unusual procedural posture a case assumes as a result of the declaratory judgment remedy makes Gully's focus on the language of the complaint inadequate. It is precisely to accomplish the objectives of the well-pleaded complaint rule that the Court abandons Gully and examines the underlying nature of the dispute.
As the above discussion suggests, it was difficult to find a single consistent method for applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, despite its long history as the standard for assessing statutory federal question jurisdiction. The competing approaches exemplified by Gully and Skelly Oil rendered application of the rule in complex areas difficult, and led to confusing and often contradictory results. 4 8 Thus, it is not surprising that the lower federal courts were in "disarray" over the preemption removal problem. 4 7
II. PREEMPTION REMOVAL IN THE LOWER COURTS
The preemption removal problem is of relatively recent origin, perhaps because it was not until recently that the proliferation of federal regulation provided such an expansive field in which federal law might be said to preempt state law under the supremacy clause of article VI. 48 Perhaps responding to the perceived need to 45 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 46 For example, where a party seeks an injunction against the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state law, his position is virtually identical to that of a plaintiff seeking a declaration that the law is unconstitutional. Both plaintiffs anticipate an "underlying" action based on state law. In the injunction context, however, the court makes its jurisdictional determination on the basis of the complaint for injunctive relief, rather than attempting to recharacterize the claim in terms of an "underlying" cause of action. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908) .
Another example of such difficulties is the Court's inconsistent treatment of original jurisdiction in cases based on the incorporation of federal law into a state law cause of action. . 1951) , was apparently the first reported case allowing preemption removal. Since the 1951 decision in Fay, the preemption removal issue has appeared rather regularly in the vindicate strong federal policy interests in areas of pervasive federal regulation, the lower courts advanced various related theories for allowing removal based on preemption despite the fact that preemption was first raised defensively. 4 A number of courts, however, applied the well-pleaded complaint rule flatly to reject preemption removal. 50
A. The Emergence of Preemption Removal
This apparent conflict between the requirements of the wellpleaded complaint rule and the need for a federal forum to vindicate strong federal interests first surfaced in the field of labor law.
In " Several qualifications are necessary. First, since federal jurisdiction under § 301 is not exclusive, see supra note 53, any inference of the policy favoring federal enforcement is somewhat weakened. Second, one can argue that, insofar as the policy is, at bottom, a defendant's right to a federal forum, it begs the question to assert that there is a conflict between the plaintiff's mastery of his complaint and the defendant's right to a federal forum: if the well-pleaded complaint rule bars removal, defendant has no such right and the interest identified is one protected by appeal rather than by removal. See supra note 24. This corn-
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The American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 55 which also involved jurisdiction under section 301 of the LMRA, and is the seminal case for allowing preemption removal. 6 Although the plaintiff in Fay couched his complaint solely in terms of state law, the court invoked the rule that "where federal jurisdiction hinges on the parties', or one of them, having a particular status, the court may ascertain the existence of that status independently of the complaint." 5 The plaintiff's status as "a union representing employees in an industry affecting commerce" placed it within the ambit of section 301." 8 The court held that in light of the creation of a body of substantive federal law under section 301, federal law had preempted the field of collective bargaining agreements, and the plaintiff therefore could not choose to rely solely on state law. 59 In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 6 o the Supreme Court tacitly approved the Fay rationale. The plaintiff in Avco did not rely on federal law in his complaint, but the court of appeals approved removal based on reasoning similar to that in Fay. 61 The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction without mentioning the wellpleaded complaint rule, stating simply that "[a]n action arising under § 301 is controlled by federal substantive law even though it is brought in a state court." 2 Thus, it was "clear" that the claim ment will argue that such an analysis is inappropriate after Franchise Tax Board, which acknowledges the power of the court to look beyond the complaint and recharacterize the dispute in order to vindicate the particularly strong federal interest associated with certain kinds of preemption. Even assuming the existence of a federal question in the complaint, the Avco opinion is somewhat obscure about the statutory basis for federal jurisdiction. Since § 301 is itself a grant of jurisdiction, one might assume that it confers federal jurisdiction over the body of federal common law it authorizes the courts to create. If that were the case, failure to mention the well-pleaded complaint rule would be understandable, since § 301, as a narrow grant of jurisdiction, might be seen as one to which the well-pleaded complaint rule, as a principle of statutory interpretation, need not apply. See supra note 25 (discussing the applicablity of the well-pleaded complaint rule to narrow, as opposed to general, grants of jurisdiction). However, Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, rested federal jurisdiction not directly on § 301 but on 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982), which is a general grant of federal jurisdiction over "proceedings" related to commerce. 390 U.S. at 561-62. In light of this rationale, it is somewhat surprising that the well-pleaded complaint was never mentioned, much less applied.
" See, e.g 
The University of Chicago Law Review move in these contexts met with mixed success. 6 s The principal argument advanced by lower courts for allowing preemption removal was that where there has been federal preemption, the complaint necessarily presents a federal cause of action. 9 Under this rationale, the court merely determines the real nature of the plaintiff's cause of action and since, by virtue of federal preemption, the complaint necessarily presents a federal cause of action, removal does not violate the well-pleaded complaint rule.
7 0 Occasionally, courts went so far as to suggest that there was an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule whenever a preemption defense was raised, reasoning that the existence of pre- Preemption removal met with substantial resistance, however. In La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 7 2 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit emphasized that the removal statute should be narrowly construed to protect the jurisdiction of state courts. 73 The court rejected Fay expressly, reasoning that federal district courts should not "engraft exceptions [onto the wellpleaded complaint rule] contrary to the legislative policy so zealously protected by the Supreme Court." 7 4 Other courts, often relying on Gully, reasoned that since preemption is raised by the defendant, it is indistinguishable from other federal defenses, and cannot be used to convert a complaint that relies on state law into a case arising under federal law. 75 Moreover, such courts reasoned, comity would best be served by allowing state courts to rule first on the question of preemption, because state courts can be safely trusted to apply federal law 76 and because there will ultimately be review in a federal forum through appeal to the Supreme Court.'
11 See, e.g -122 and accompanying text. The essence of preemption removal is the recognition that the plaintiff's cause of action is in fact federal, so that removal is allowed within the well-pleaded complaint rule. Under the analysis to be developed in this comment, the basis for removal based on preemption is that the peculiarly strong federal interest which underlies certain instances of preemption is sufficient to displace the ordinary rule of Gully that, for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule, the plaintiff is master of his complaint. If federal preemption is not of this nature, but is merely a defense, removal is improper. The problem left by Franchise Tax Board is how to tell one kind of preemption from the other. This comment offers one suggestion. See infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
72 506 F.2d 339, 343-45 (3d Cir. 1974 506 F.2d 339, 343-45 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1006 506 F.2d 339, 343-45 (3d Cir. (1975 . Lacoste instituted a state law declaratory judgment action in state court. Alligator sought removal, arguing that the Skelly Oil declaratory judgment rule ought to apply and that the court must unravel the complaint in order to determine what the action would be in an ordinary lawsuit. Alligator claimed that the action so revealed was preempted by federal law. The court disagreed, holding that even if the federal declaratory judgment rule were to apply to a state declaratory judgment action, there existed no preemption in the case before it, and therefore, even if Fay were correct, removal would be improper. 
B. The Development of Preemption Removal in the Lower Courts
Preemption removal expanded despite these objections. 7 8 Application of preemption removal remained difficult in two respects, however, even for those courts adopting the doctrine. First, as noted above, there was confusion as to the proper understanding of the well-pleaded complaint rule. 7 9 Some courts quite understandably read the Gully statement of the rule as requiring the language of the plaintiff's complaint itself to present a federal question, and either rejected preemption removal outright, 0 or created an exception to the rule in cases where the plaintiff allegedly pleaded in bad faith to avoid the federal issue.s-Other courts interpreted the rule to require that the federal question be presented by the plaintiff's cause of action, and therefore considered it proper to look beyond the language of the complaint to identify the cause of action. 2 A second source of confusion was the difficulty in distinguishing a defense alleging that the plaintiff's state law cause of action had been preempted by federal law from a case in which preemption meant that the plaintiff's cause of action was necessarily a federal one.
83 Not every court made such a distinction, however. Some courts reasoned that whenever preemption was raised as a defense a federal question was necessarily presented, and removal was therefore proper. These two difficulties led to confusion among the lower courts over preemption removal. This confusion frequently manifested itself in the adoption of one of two tests for identifying those cases for which preemption removal was appropriate. First, a number of 78 See supra notes 64-68; infra notes 79-94.
See supra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.
:0 See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. I' See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. This exception, the so-called "artful pleading" doctrine, is discussed infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. The principal problem with those cases that have held that federal preemption gives rise to jurisdiction is that they merely assert, but do not make an effort to justify a distinction between raising a federal defense, which clearly does not give rise to removal jurisdiction, and raising federal preemption, which they indicate does.
Id. at 1154; see supra note 71; infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text (explaining the difference).
" See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
[51:634 courts focused on the plaintiff's efforts to defeat federal jurisdiction and created the "artful pleading" doctrine. 85 For example, in Hearst Corp. v. Shopping Center Network," 8 the court reasoned that "where Congress has explicitly said that the exclusive source of a plaintiff's right to relief is to be federal law, it would be unacceptable to permit that very plaintiff, by the artful manipulation of the terms of a complaint, to defeat a clearly enunciated congressional objective. ' 87 The artful pleading doctrine's emphasis on the plaintiff's improper motive is in part a response to the Gully view of the well-pleaded complaint rule that limits the court's inquiry to the face of the complaint. An exception to that construction of the rule is justified on the theory that where a plaintiff misstates the gravamen of his claim, the court may look beyond the complaint to determine the real nature of the claim.' Artful pleading emerged as a dominant theme in analyzing the preemption removal problem." S7 Id. at 556 (emphasis added). The Hearst court relied on reasoning similar to that in Fay. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. The plaintiff's improper motive and manipulation of his complaint, however, received additional emphasis in Hearst. The analysis in Hearst, indeed the entire artful pleading doctrine, is somewhat circular. The plaintiff's bad faith in avoiding the federal issue is inferred from the conclusion that there has been preemption so that the plaintiff's state cause of action must fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. No reason is given why the plaintiff cannot simply waive any federal rights he may have and assert only his state law claim in a state court, subject to a preemption defense. Insofar as the plaintiff has this right, there is no "bad faith" or "artful manipulation" involved. It is this inherent circularity which leads this comment to advocate the abandonment of the artful pleading doctrine. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
Prior to Franchise Tax Board, there was a conflict in the courts as to whether preemption removal could be proper absent a finding of artful pleading. "[w] here ... superseding federal law does not replace rights formerly granted by State law, it is illogical to say that the litigant's claim is really predicated on a body of law which grants him no rights. ' 9 2 This rationale is frequently used to distinguish cases in which federal preemption is merely a defense from cases in which preemption removal is considered proper. 9 The superseding cause of action rationale also occasionally appears in combination with the artful pleading doctrine. These cases provide the background against which Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust s was decided. The lower courts had reflected the ambiguity in the wellpleaded complaint rule in their uncertainty over whether the court should limit its inquiry to the complaint or engage in an analysis of the underlying nature of the plaintiff's cause of action. Having generally accepted the latter approach in the preemption removal context, the lower courts then added to the confusion by providing , 412 F. Supp. 720, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) .
91 412 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1976 ).
92 Id. at 723. See, e.g., Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364 , 1366 -67 (9th Cir. 1981 ), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982 .
9"
" See, e.g., Long Island R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 484 F. Supp. 1290 , 1292 -93 (S.D.N.Y. 1980 . The artful pleading doctrine and the superseding cause of action requirement are often treated as variations of the same principle. Artful pleading is frequently little more than a label attached to the plaintiff's failure to plead a superseding cause of action, and the presence of a superseding cause of action simply establishes the conditions under which artful pleading can occur. Since both doctrines derive from the difficulty of ascertaining precisely when the plaintiff's cause of action is necessarily a federal one, in many cases it is true that they are one and the same. Analytically, however, and quite often in application, they remain distinct concepts. Artful pleading involves an element of improper intent, which may be present or absent independently of whether or not the preempting federal law also provides a superseding cause of action. The tendency of the courts to merge these approaches has obscured both this analytical difference and the real underlying basis for removal. As a result, little attention has been devoted to considering the appropriateness either of examining the plaintiff's motive as a factor in determining whether removal is proper or of requiring a superseding cause of action. This comment attempts to do both. See infra notes 123-57 and accompanying text.
95 103 S. Ct. 2841 Ct. (1983 .
additional limitations on when preemption removal applied. These limitations took the form of the related but distinct artful pleading doctrine and superseding cause of action requirement. Franchise Tax Board provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify these issues.
III. Franchise Tax Board
Franchise Tax Board involved an attempt by the plaintiff California Franchise Tax Board (the "Board") to recover unpaid taxes by attaching a taxpayer's interest in the defendant Construction Laborers Vacation Trust (the "Trust"). Because the Trust was covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 8 the Board expected that the Trust would assert that ERISA preempted the Board's state law cause of action. Therefore, in addition to its attachment action, the Board filed a separate claim for declaratory relief that its attachment claim was not preempted by ERISA.
9 7 The Trust removed the case to federal district court, asserting preemption under ERISA as the basis for federal jurisdiction. 8 The district court allowed removal, and held for the Board on the merits. 9 The Supreme Court never reached the merits, holding apologetically that the district court had improperly allowed removal. 10 0 Justice Brennan had little difficulty in concluding that preemption under ERISA was merely a defense to the Board's state-law attachment claim. 10 1 The Court then turned to the Board's complaint for declaratory relief, which on its face presented a federal question of the preemptive effect of ERISA on the Board's state law attachment claim. The Court extended to state-court declaratory judgment actions removed to federal court the Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 10 2 rule that jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions should be determined on the basis of an underlying action for damages or injunction rather 
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The University of Chicago Law Review than on the complaint for declaratory relief. 103 The Court then held that the well-pleaded complaint rule precluded federal jurisdiction because the underlying cause of action-the Board's attachment claim-arose under state law. 1 0e Although the Court might have concluded its opinion at this point, it went on to respond at some length to the Trust's argument that removal was proper under Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 
735,
which had tacitly approved preemption removal. 108 The
Franchise Tax Board Court recognized that, while a plaintiff is normally the master of his complaint, "it is an independent corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in 122 Id.
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule cases preemption removal was proper, the Court did not expressly resolve the underlying uncertainty as to the proper interpretation of the well-pleaded complaint rule, nor did it give much guidance for the difficult task of distinguishing between cases where preemption is merely a defense and those where preemption removal is consistent with the well-pleaded complaint rule. As a result, the status of the artful pleading doctrine and the superseding cause of action requirement remains unclear. Nonetheless, an analysis of the Court's treatment of the preemption removal problem yields insights into all three of these questions.
A. Franchise Tax Board and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Although the Court in Franchise Tax Board did not directly address the ambiguity in the interpretation of the well-pleaded complaint rule, the decision clearly proceeds from the assumption that the focus of the inquiry under the well-pleaded complaint rule is the actual nature of the underlying cause of action and not merely the language of the plaintiff's complaint. 11 3 Indeed, the Court found it to be "an independent corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint."' 1 4 This emphasis on the cause of action is repeated throughout Franchise Tax Board." 5 The Court carefully distinguished cases in which preemption is merely a defense from those in which preemption M' See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text. In fact, although the Franchise Tax be master of his own complaint must yield. 121 The Franchise Tax Board view of the well-pleaded complaint rule provides a better method for applying the rule. While applying the well-pleaded complaint rule certainly requires some concern for administrative convenience, administrability does not explain why the courts disregard allegations in a complaint that anticipate a defense, or, more importantly, why the courts recharacterize declaratory judgment actions to identify a hypothetical underlying cause of action. Departures such as these result from a recognition that the purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule may require the Court to look past the plaintiff's complaint. The rule requires ascertaining whether the cause of action that constitutes the underlying dispute is actually federal. If it is a federal cause of action, there is original federal question jurisdiction. Thus, even if one assumes that to promote administrative convenience the courts normally accept the Gully construction of the well-pleaded complaint rule, one can understand why the same courts also disregard this concern when the more fundamental purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule are served by doing so. 122 12 103 S. Ct. at 2853. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Avco. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
121 An important aspect of the Franchise Tax Board and Avco approach which the Court has never addressed is precisely why the important federal policy of preemption requires that the plaintiff's complaint be recharacterized as federal so that removal is allowed. It would be possible to serve the federal interest by letting the plaintiff assert only his statelaw claims, thereby essentially "waiving" any federal claims. If the plaintiff is allowed to rely solely on state law, and that law has been completely preempted, then the plaintiff should lose on his state-law claim in state court. If the state court is hostile to federal law and nonetheless allows recovery, there is appellate review of the "complete preemption" claim in the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982) . The procedural protection of federal rights under such an approach would not differ from that accorded any party asserting a federal defense to a state law claim, and it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not explain in Franchise Tax Board its basis for treating preemption differently from other, similar claims. One basis for doing so is technical. It is not the well-pleaded complaint rule that is changed by the force of the argument from complete preemption. Rather, it is merely the link between that rule and the notion that the plaintiff is master of his own complaint that is severed. It is this latter interest that must give way to the preemptive force of federal law, and, once that occurs, the courts' examination of the underlying cause of action can be unrestrained, and the courts can recharacterize the action as arising under federal law, whereupon standard application of the well-pleaded complaint rule will then find jurisdiction proper.
The answer that complete preemption makes the cause of action federal, however, while technically correct, is still not completely satisfying. Why should the court presume that plaintiff wants to assert any federal rights rather than to waive them? And if, indeed, the plaintiff intends to waive his federal rights, the court has authority to decide neither the case upon removal nor even the preemption issue. A more thorough analysis than that given by the Court in Avco or Franchise Tax Board is needed to explain what purposes of federal Several reasons may be advanced in support of the result. First, the distinction between ordinary preemption and the "complete preemption" of which the Franchise Tax Board Court speaks highlights a peculiarly powerful federal interest in the operative substantive law. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text. Congress has spoken more forcefully when it preempts an entire field of law and has indicated its desire that only federal law remain. This is the federal interest that compels the Court to look beyond the face of the complaint; the necessary jurisdictional consequence is that the cause of action is made federal, permitting removal.
Second, there is force to the argument that when Congress has acted to preempt an entire field, reliance on appeal to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) to vindicate the federal concerns is inadequate. Congress's intent was to displace state-law causes of action entirely. Because of the time or expense involved or for any of a number of reasons, not all appeals will be pursued. The option to remove enhances the likelihood that this federal interest in preempting the field will not be subverted by hostile state courts. Finally, it must be noted that the plaintiff does not lose his right to waive federal claims. He may still waive these claims and suffer a dismissal. All the plaintiff loses is the chance to litigate state-law claims that no longer properly have the force of law, in the hope that the fact of preemption will not be raised. 394 (1981) . The plaintiffs in Moitie had refiled actions in state court which previously had been dismissed on the merits in federal court. Id. at 395-96. Before considering whether the later actions were barred by res judicata, the Court addressed the threshold question of whether the district court below had properly allowed the action to be removed from state court. Id. at 397 n.2. Agreeing that "at least some of the claims had a sufficient federal character to support removal," id. at 397 n.2, the Court held that it would "not permit plaintiff to use artful pleading to close off defendant's right to a federal forum," id.
(quoting C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 85, § 3722, at 564-66). The Court accepted the factual finding below of artful pleading. Id. Moitie is a fine example of the confused results produced by the focus on plaintiff's motive in the artful pleading doctrine. The Court permits removal even though the plaintiff alleges state law exclusively, obviously confusing the importance that res judicata may have as a federal policy with the force of preemption as a federal policy. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text. Res judicata does not provide sufficient warrant for the Court to look past the face of the complaint. Preemption, expressing congressional as well as constitutional concerns, raises issues beyond the mere considerations of judicial economy underlying claim preclusion. By focusing on the intent of the plaintiffs, the Court seems to have missed this fact. In Moitie, a preferable disposition would have been to remand to the state court to dismiss on the res judicata Board Court's failure to invoke artful pleading might be interpreted as evidencing a retreat from its prior acceptance of the doctrine.
Indeed, since Franchise Tax Board separates the plaintiff's mastery of his complaint from the well-pleaded complaint rule, 127 an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule such as the artful pleading doctrine is no longer required. Any focus on the plaintiff's motive is misplaced: it is not the plaintiff's bad motive which renders a case removable but rather the effect of preemption on his cause of action. In general, where both state and federal law provide a cause of action, the plaintiff is free to ignore the federal law and rely solely on state law even if his only reason for doing so is to avoid federal jurisdiction. 128 After Franchise Tax Board, however, where federal law has "completely preempted" the state law cause of action, it is proper to recharacterize the action as one that actually arises under federal law, despite the plaintiff's usual mastery over his complaint. ' 2 9 It is not the motive of defeating federal jurisdiction that justifies removal. Whether or not the plaintiff's state law cause has been preempted, his motive for relying on state law is the same. The effect of "complete preemption" justifies recharacterizing the complaint as federal regardless of the plaintiff's motives. 13 0 The artful pleading doctrine's focus on the plaintiff's motive diverts attention from the proper analysis of the relationship between preemption and the plaintiff's cause of action. 1 31 For example, some courts have suggested that if the plaintiff is simply negligent, removal might be proper on the basis of a preemption defense. ' In other cases, even where a federal cause of action has completely preempted a state law cause of action removal has been denied on the ground that the plaintiff had relied on state law in good faith. 13 
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Franchise Tax Board that finds justification for removal in the necessarily federal nature of the plaintiff's cause of action. Although careful application of the artful pleading doctrine might yield correct results, the doctrine is not essential to the rationale of preemption removal advanced in Franchise Tax Board, and should be abandoned.
C. Franchise Tax Board and the Superseding Cause of Action Requirement
Franchise Tax Board is also unclear as to whether a superseding federal cause of action is necessary for preemption removal. The Court's statement of the Avco principle does suggest that the presence of a superseding federal cause is an important element in allowing removal: removal is proper where "a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of action .... 134 And it does appear somewhat illogical to say that the plaintiff's cause of action arises under federal law when federal law grants him no cause of action. Yet, if the existence of a superseding federal cause were a requirement for removal, the absence of such a cause under ERISA should have been dispositive in Franchise Tax Board, and the Court's ensuing discussion of other factors would have been unnecessary. Moreover, in contrast to lower court cases relying on the presence of a superseding cause to limit preemption removal, 135 the Supreme Court did not refer to the presence of a superseding cause as a requirement; 36 the absence of a superseding cause of action under ERISA was but one factor used by the Franchise Tax Board Court to distinguish Avco. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Franchise Tax Board thus leaves open the possibility that preemption removal is in some instances proper despite the absence of a superseding federal cause of action. The question then becomes whether such removal is consistent with the Franchise Tax Board view of the well-pleaded complaint rule that requires that a federal question must be presented by the plaintiff's cause of action. If federal law merely preempts state law without substituting a federal cause of action, the only result of the preemption is that the plaintiff loses for failure to state a claim. In such cases preemption does indeed appear to be merely a defense. And, since 134 103 S. Ct. at 2854.
135 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 136 103 S. Ct. at 2854-55. 137 The Court also made arguments from the language of the ERISA statute and the legislative history and general policies behind ERISA. See id.
